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THE LOGIC OF LEGAL REMEDIES AND THE RELATIVE
WEIGHT OF NORMS: ASSESSING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
IN THE TORT REFORM DEBATE

Irma S. Russell

I. INTRODUCTION

The integrity of any analysis of legal claims depends upon accurate
identification of the competing interests and legitimate comparison of
the weight of those interests. The background principles of consistency
and proportionality play a significant, though sometimes overlooked,
role in legal rules and analysis. These concepts provide normative
guidance and a framework to compare and value interests. They also
reveal the relative strength of the individuals' interests and the public's
interest in a particular context. For example, the principle of consistency
generally means that a legal doctrine applying an objective measure of
one's interest must apply a like-kind measure to all interests considered,
absent some explicit and justifiable reason for varying treatment.
Moreover, a comparison of the remedies invoked for violations of norms
provides a key to the relative weight of norms.
Part II of this essay examines the need to identify, measure, and
compare the interests at stake in any legal contest with rigorous
consistency. It also notes the corollary principle of proportionality as a
limiting principle that guards against foolish or destructive consistency.
Part III explores the natural hierarchy among legal norms and the weight
accorded various types of interests that deserve legal protection. Part IV
considers the system of measurement presented by the current tort
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reform movement, exploring the failure of many proponents of tort
reform to account for or accommodate the tradition of a more generous
and protective measure of damages in tort law as compared with contract
law. It notes the failure of proponents of tort reform to consider the
traditional role of tort damages in creating compensation for victims of
negligent conduct, preserving physical security of individuals and the
public, and creating disincentives against negligent conduct. It also
explores the failure of some proponents of tax reform to count the cost to
the public interests involved, diluting the principal goals of tort law.
Part V concludes that identification of both individual and collective
interests and consideration of the fundamental incentives of tort law
should be an integral and explicit part of the debate on tort reform.

II. THE PRINCIPLES OF CONSISTENCY AND PROPORTIONALITY
The principle of consistency requires equal assessment and
measurement of competing interests. References to fair balances, such
as weights, equilibrium, and other metaphors for consistency, abound in
the law.' The ubiquitous nature of the principle of consistency does not
mean, however, that all interests are equally important. Considerations
of proportionality, the significance of the interests at stake, and the
gravity of the potential harm to the interests lead to a natural hierarchy
of legal principles.
In the context of literal measurements, inaccurate measures violate
both tort and contract mandates. A fake or falsified weighing process is
subject to significant punishment because it distorts the system at its
base.2 An accurate measure of weight is essential in a sale of goods, a

1. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 199 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that
"[w]hen the responsibilities of lawmaker, prosecutor, judge, jury and disciplinarian are thrust upon a
judge he is obviously incapable of holding the scales of justice perfectly fair and true and reflecting
impartially on the guilt or innocence of the accused"); Libertarian Party of Me. v. Diamond, 992
F.2d 365, 370 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that "courts have attempted a constitutional equilibrium
between the legitimate constitutional interests of the States in conducting fair and orderly elections
and the First Amendment rights of voters and candidates"); AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv.
P'ship., 740 F.2d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that "[a]lthough the scales appear to us to be
nearly evenly weighted, they tip in favor of subject-matter jurisdiction..."); In re San Juan Dupont
Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 129 F.R.D. 409, 417 (D.P.R. 1989), vacated and remanded sub noma.
In re
Nineteen Appeals Arising out of San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 982 F.2d 603 (tst Cir.
1992) (stating that "it is hard to imagine how this Court could, in the public's eye, fall from the high

wire of propriety when the balancing pole is so evenly weighted"); People v. Kurtz, 216 N.E.2d
524, 526 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1966) (noting the problem of maintaining "a stable equilibrium between the
freedom of the press and the right of one accused of crime to a fair trial before a jury not influenced
by publicity regarding the alleged offense").
2.

See Nielson v. Flashberg, 419 P.2d 514 (Ariz. 1966) (upholding verdict of actual and
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sale of real estate, and all manner of other measuring devices and
techniques in other areas. An inexact measure, lacking metes and
bounds, will undermine a claim.4
In his concurring opinion in Patterson v. Shumate, Justice Scalia
used the metaphor of the scales to emphasize the foundational
presumption of consistency in the law. "I trust that in our search for a
neutral and rational interpretive methodology we have now come to rest,
so that the symbol of our profession may remain the scales, not the
seesaw."5 In Patterson, a federal district court ordered that a debtor's
interest in a qualified plan under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA") be paid over to the trustee in bankruptcy.6 The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's order
on the ground that debtor's interest in the plan was excludable from
estate property. 7 The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's
decision.8
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia urged for consistency in
interpretation of definitions within a statutory scheme. "Speaking of
agreed-upon methodology: It is good that the Court's analysis today
proceeds on the assumption that use of the phrases 'state law' and
'applicable nonbankruptcy law' in other provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code is highly relevant" in determining meaning in the provision at
issue. 9 Justice Scalia noted the presumptive nature of consistency in
interpretation within a statute, calling it the "normal and obvious
principle of statutory construction."' 0 He emphasized the strength of his
view, using the metaphorical and critical reference to the seesaw as the
symbol for "a one-subsection-at-a-time approach."" Justice Scalia's
rationale on this point went beyond the scope of the Patterson case to
note a general presumed norm of consistent interpretation and fair
measurement, stating that consistent "usage within the same statute is to

punitive damages against a public weight master for providing false certificates of weight).
3. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Chertoff, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1, 29 (D.D.C. 2005)
(calling new standards for collective bargaining "new metes and bounds for collective bargaining").
4. See Blue Mountain Pres. Ass'n v. Township of Eldred, 867 A.2d 692 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2005) (remanding for identification of site because a lack of metes and bounds description resulted
in a lack of certainty of location).
5. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 756.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 766.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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be presumed."' 12 Such a general norm of consistency has a far greater
sphere of operation than the particular case at issue because, as Justice
Scalia's treatment suggests, the approach of consistent interpretation
applies to interpretation generally.
The law demonstrates the principle of proportionality by
recognizing the varying degrees of protection afforded by different legal
doctrines. Criminal law, tort law, and contract law all present different
damage formulas and sanctions based on the differing strength of the
norms for protecting the interests at stake. The law recognizes that the
strength of the interests protected by the legal norms varies based on the
interests at stake and the conduct that violates the norm involved.
Likewise, the culpability attaching to the breach of particular norms
bears a relationship to the interests harmed by the particular breach.
Additional evidence of the importance of proportionality in the law is
found in comparisons of the penalty for violation of a criminal law with
the harm inflicted by the criminal act. In other words, criminal sanctions
must be proportionate to the harm caused by the breach of the criminal
law. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the application of
the death penalty to the crime of rape violated the Constitution because
of the disproportionality between the harm suffered by the victim and
the sanction.' 3 The Supreme Court has also held other types of
punishment disproportionate to the crime.14
III. A HIERARCHY OF NORMS
The norms established by law influence the behavior of people in
virtually all aspects of life. Moreover, courts and scholars study the
influence of norms on a wide range of legal issues. 15 The range of
12. Id.
13. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding the death penalty for rape
unconstitutional on ground that disproportionate sanction violates the Eighth Amendment); but see
Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1072 (La. 1996) (holding death penalty not excessive
punishment for rape of child under twelve).
14. See, e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1984) (describing two forms of
proportionality review); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (holding deprivation of citizenship
excessive punishment for wartime desertion); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910)
(holding 15 years hard labor excessive for falsifying public document); see generally Timothy V.
Kaufman-Osborn, Capital Punishment, Proportionality Review, and Claims of Fairness (with
Lessons From Washington State), 79 WASH. L. REv. 775, 813-14 (2004).

15. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost
Analysis of ConstitutionalRemedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135 (2005) (noting novelty of applying and
proceeding to apply transaction cost framework to constitutional entitlements). For comparisons of
the effects of different sanctions, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules versus
Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996).
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norms established by law and the types of sanctions applied by law are
wide ranging. "Monetary incentives and deterrents are not the only
mechanisms through which law affects behavior. Law also exerts
influence through its effects on social norms, the market, or1 other
6
circumstances that people consider when deciding how to behave.
Legal norms are by no means uniform and do not intend to establish
equal emphasis on all rights or risks. The law obviously regards the
violation of the norms established by criminal law as more serious than
the norms of either tort or contract law. The need for significant
criminal sanctions is based on a judgment that the interests protected by
criminal law deserve significant and serious legal incentives. Put
another way, the violation of the public norms of criminal law are
regarded as more blameworthy and deserving of serious sanctions than
violations of the norms of tort law or contract law. Thus, the law
recognizes a relationship between the importance of the public interest
protected by a norm and the culpability of the violation of that interest
through a breach of the norm.
The sanctions accorded under tort law are not as severe as those of
criminal law; yet, they are significantly more far reaching than contract
damages. Seen this way, the sanctions of criminal, tort, and contract law
present a continuum of sanctions. These sanctions range from the very
serious punishment under criminal statutes to the full measure of
damages, including punitive damages, in tort law. Finally, contract
damages are a more limited form of compensation. Both criminal and
tort law involve the breach of public norms. In a sense, a breach of
contract also involves a private norm created by the parties. The term
"private law" generally refers to law that "traditionally encompassed the
common law of contract, torts, and property that regulate relations
among individuals."' 17 However, the public-private distinction is also
valid in describing the dichotomy among norms, such as those
established by tort law and contract law. 18 One can choose not to enter a
contract. By contrast, one cannot refuse to be subject to tort sanctions
against negligent conduct. 19 The social contract between the driver and
the pedestrian crossing the street is a public norm that neither can avoid.
Everyone is subject to the public norm not to create unreasonable risks
16.

Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 1016 (2004).

17. Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatizationof Government Functions, 84
N.C. L. REV. 397, 404 (2006).

18. See id. (noting that "all legal regimes, even if ostensibly private at common law, are in
some sense public").
19.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979).
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of harm to others. The measure of damages afforded for a breach of the
private contractual order is clearly more limited than the sanctions of
criminal or tort law. Contract damages are not intended to punish the
party unless the breach also constitutes a violation of a public
breaching
2
norm.

0

Contract law encourages parties to plan for the future by bargaining
for future performance. As a result, society as a whole gains a significant
benefit - the certainty in future markets that allows a modem economy
to exist. With its approach to damages, contract law neutralizes the risk
of shifts in the market value of resources and the individual will of the
contracting parties. Market participants recognize that the benefit of
securing a commitment from the other carries the risk of being obligated
to perform or pay damages for a substitute performance, despite the
potential of unfavorable market shifts. The foundation, or "given," of
contract law is the "deal," the agreement of the parties, including its
allocation of future risks and benefits. 2 1 A party who is injured by the
breach of the other may seek a substitute transaction, such as "cover" for
the goods. The aggrieved buyer can purchase the same goods on the
market. If the substitute goods cost more than the contract price,
contract law provides a damage measure whereby the breaching party
pays the difference in the cost of cover, as well as incidental and
consequential damages. Thus, when the seller under a goods contract
refuses to deliver, the buyer can recover damages based on the cover
price22 If the aggrieved buyer covers, he can obtain substitute goods at
the original price set by the contract via Section 2-712 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC). Thus, the formula for a breach in a simple
case of sale of goods demonstrates the incentives set by contract law,
giving the aggrieved party the benefit of the bargain by allocating the
additional costs of the cover contract to the breaching party.
20. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981).
21. Economists sought to discredit the classical and elegantly simple bargain theory of
contract, emphasizing the exceptions to the rule of consideration. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS
ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 179-84 (2000) (using two examples of firm offer in the sale of goods
and reasonable reliance to assert that the bargain theory of contract is "wrong"). The economic
critique of bargain theory merely shows that courts enforce some promises that do not meet the test
of consideration. The fact of additional enforceable categories of promises does not invalidate the
main force of bargain theory, i.e., that the parties allocate interests based on their bargain and
contract law enforces those allocations by the default measure of expectancy.
22. The measure of damages often does not fully compensate the injured party because it fails
to include the transaction costs of collecting damages. For example, the injured party must pay for
the attorney's fees incurred as a result of pursuing damages against the breaching party. Thus, as a
practical matter, the UCC's regime under-compensates plaintiffs. Other works establish the failure
of the UCC measure to fully compensate the injured party.
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The principle against punishing a party for breach of the private
contract norm presents a weaker norm than tort law. The offending
party who is guilty of breaching the public norm of tort law by creating
unreasonable risks to another faces more severe penalties, including
punitive damages intended to punish the tortfeasor as well as making the
23
injured party "whole.,
One of the chief functions of law is to influence behavior, and much of
our understanding of law assumes that most people will seek to
conform their conduct to what the law requires, whether from a sense
of simple obligation or because the system of legal incentives
and
24
deterrents makes it instrumentally rational for them to do so.
The strength of the social norm for protecting the safety and
physical integrity of members of society individually as well as
collectively generally trumps economic considerations. Certainly,
economic and financial interests deserve protection.
Incentives to
protect financial interests are by no means trivial.25 Nevertheless, the
measure of damages or punishment should be commensurate with harm
or culpability. Sanctions applicable to conduct that breaches a public
norm of criminal law or tort law are a reflection of, and differing views
of, both the culpability of the conduct at issue and the interests at stake.
The liberty interest also influences common law and statutory law
standards, leading to such things as the rejection of specific performance
of personal services contracts. 26 Society's choice of punishment for the
23. Compare RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 903, 908 (1979) (defining
compensatory damages as those which are necessary to put the party in the position she would have
been had no tort been committed and stating that punitive damages serve to punish or deter future
conduct) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 344 (1981) (stating that the purpose of
contract damages are give the aggrieved party the benefit of the bargain as if the contract had been
performed).
24. Primus, supranote 17, at 1010.
25. For example, the relatively recent judicial recognition of the theory of the well-managed

account for measuring the loss to an investor by a broker who fails to follow accepted norms shows
the significance of financial interests. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38
(2d Cir. 1978): Scalp & Blade, Inc. v. Advest, Inc., 309 A.D.2d 219 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)

(approving use the of well-managed account standard in case for mismanagement of trust fund);
Perry E. Wallace, Jr., Securities Arbitration after McMahon, Rodriguez, and the New Rules: Can
Investors'Rights Really Be Protected? 43 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1235 n. 181 (1990) (noting judicial

recognition of "well-managed account measure of damages"). See also Barbara Black & Jill J.
Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration,23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 991, 1012 n.135 (2002).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §367 (1981). See Shubert Theatrical Co. v.

Rath, 271 F. 827 (2d Cir. 1921); Fitzpatrick v. Michael, 9 A.2d 639 (Md. 1939); Felch v. Findlay
Coll., 200 N.E. 2d 353 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963); Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 51 A. 973 (Penn.
1902).
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breach of criminal laws reflects the importance of those norms. The
punishment for such violations may include deprivation of property,
liberty, or, in extreme cases, death under capital punishment statutes.
Such significant sanctions apply to the most egregious breaches of social
norms, such as murder, rape, and physical assault. The principle of
proportionality applies even with regard to extreme harms.2 7
Varying levels of protection for varying interests often turn on
whether the interest at issue relates to safety or economic interests. For
example, the failure of a seller of property to reveal environmental
contamination to the purchaser may lead to significant liability to the
seller when the condition constitutes a material defect unknown to the
buyer. 28 The significance of the risk of harm is also an important factor
in establishing the hierarchy of laws. For example, both federal and
state statutes provide significant sanctions for violating environmental
laws that protect individuals and the public from unreasonable risk of
harm. Environmental statutes provide for punishment of those who fail
or refuse to control environmental risks at prescribed levels and by
prescribed mechanisms.29 State and federal environmental statutes
provide both civil and criminal sanctions,
including significant fines and
31
imprisonment 30 for knowing violations.
Property or economic interests evoke lesser protection than
sanctions accorded to the interest in bodily integrity. Tort law provides
incentives to encourage safe practices and discourage negligent conduct.
"Tort law does and should provide deterrence as well as compensation,
and if wrongful death actions produce significant under-deterrence,
something is seriously amiss. 32 The net result may be greater costs for
actors in the world but lower costs to society as a whole, by virtue of the
costs saved in terms of the injuries and pain and suffering avoided by
enhanced safety. The burden to act in a non-negligent manner preserves
physical integrity. The cost may seem out of line in a lassiez-faireworld
that accords no value for the safety created by tort principles.
27. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding death penalty violates Eighth
Amendment as disproportionate penalty for robbery); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)
(applying proportionality review to reject death penalty for rape of adult woman).
28. See New West Urban Renewal Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 909 F. Supp. 219 (D.

N.J. 1995).
29. Clean Air Act § 113(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2) (2006). The Clean Air Act classifies
knowing failure to make required reports or keep required records as a felony. See id.
30. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006).
31. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1994); Solid Waste Disposal Act § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d) (1994).
32. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 540
(2005).
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Nevertheless, the transfer of costs to the negligent party is a basic
premise of modem American tort law and is generally endorsed as
consistent with the economic approach to law as well as traditional
norms.
Modem tort theory is founded upon the so-called "Hand Formula,"
which considers the probability of harm (P), the cost of harm (L), and
the burden of taking precautions to prevent harm (B). Under this
formula, a defendant is liable in negligence if and only if B < PL. This
negligence33formula provides the proper incentives to a prospective
defendant.
The system of judgment advocated by standards of comparison and
measurement deserves study in relation to the substantive doctrines that
impose different standards of care. Identifying an appropriate measure
for a particular loss also involves judgments about the severity of the
loss or the interest compromised. For example, in the area of physical
injury, damages for pain and suffering may compensate injured parties
in only an approximate way. However, these damages also provide
incentives for minimizing the risk of physical harm in the jurisdiction.34
Punitive damages apply to create disincentives for outrageously
negligent conduct, 35 as explained by recent Supreme Court decisions.
Similarly, statutory treble damages and the doctrine of strict
liability secure heightened incentives in situations deemed to require
clear expression of the social norm against the sanctioned conduct.
Treble damage statutes demonstrate the use of damages to create
incentives that protect society in addition to the consumer harmed by the
conduct that violates the statute. Both statutory and common law tort
doctrines seek to minimize risks with diverse approaches.
IV. TORT REFORM: MEASURING AND COMPARING THE INTERESTS

The debate on tort reform in the United States is far from a new

33. Matthew S. Levine, Punishment and Willingness to Pay, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 329 (20042005) (citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Learned Hand,
J.) and RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 180-82 (5th ed. 1998).
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 905 (1979); see also Morris v. St. Paul City R.
Co., 117 N.W. 500 (Minn. 1908).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 908 cmt. c (1979). See also LINDA L. SCHLUETER
& KENNETH R. REDDEN, I PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.1 (D), at 24 (LexisPublishing 2005) (stating that
"in most jurisdictions, the court awards punitive damages because of the positive public policy to
punish the defendant and to serve as a warning or example to others who may commit similar
outrageous acts in the future").
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development. 36 It has a long and contentious history.37 No-fault
automobile insurance is seen as an early example of tort reform.3 8
Indeed, the genesis of the debate dates near the beginning of modem tort
law, suggesting virtually continuous disagreement about social valuing
and social norms relating to negligent conduct. 39 The tort reform debate
has provoked intense dispute among legal scholars and practitioners.4 0
The American Medical Association and the American Consulting
Engineers Counsel founded the American Tort Reform Foundation
("ATRF") in 1986.4 1 The Foundation reports that its efforts in tort
reform resulted in an "unparalleled track record of legislative success. 'A2
The ATRF website describes the foundation as a "nonpartisan, nonprofit
organization with affiliated coalitions in more than 40 states. ''43 The
ATRF reports that "America's $246 billion civil justice system is the
most expensive in the industrialized world. 4 It asserts that lawyers
"systematically recruit clients who may never have suffered a real illness
or injury and use scare tactics, combined with the' promise of awards, to
bring these people into massive class action suits. A5
In the 1970's some jurisdictions instituted mandatory arbitration or
malpractice disclosure panels for medical malpractice claims.4 6
Additionally, adjustment of tort principles in products liability litigation,
36. See Rachel M. Janutis, The Struggle Over Tort Reform and the Overlooked Legacy of the
Progressives, 39 AKRON L. REV. 943 (2006).
37. See H. Kronberg, What a Long, Strange Trip It's Been: The History of Tort Reform, TEX

MED. 1993 Mar; 89(3): 40-3; Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV.
555, 623 (1985).
38. Sugarman, supranote 37, at 623.
39.

See, e.g., Kathleen E. Payne, Linking Tort Reform to Fairness and Moral Values, 1995

DET. C.L. REV. 1207, 1215 (1995); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort
Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a Battlegroundof Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L.

REV. 1, 93 (2002) (asserting that "[t]ort retrenchment is jeopardizing the social role of tort law in
protecting the public from corporate and individual misbehavior. Women, consumers, workers and
the elderly are just a few of the groups that have benefited from the expansion of tort law after
World War If. Through the centuries, tort law has provided important protections for average
citizens against powerful interests").
40. See, e.g., Janet V. Hallahan, Social Interests Versus Plaintiffs' Rights: The Constitutional
Battle Over Statutorv Limitations on Punitive Damages, 26 LOY.U. CHI. L.J.405 (1995); Jordyn K.
McAfee, Medical Malpractice Crisis FactionalCrisis Factional or Fictional?:An Overview of the
GAO Report as Interpreted by the Proponents and Opponents of'Tort Reform, 9 J. MED. & L. 161

(2005).
41. See American Tort Reform Foundation, available at http://www.atra.org/about/ (last
visited Apr. 8, 2006).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id
45. Id.
46. Payne, supra note 39, at 1217.
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specifically design defect cases, began around the same time. 47 Some
courts have adopted restrictions in this context, limiting manufacturer
liability to damage resulting from risks known by the manufacturer.4 8
Forty-eight jurisdictions enacted some kind of tort reform legislation
between 1985 and 1988.49 These reforms included abolishing the
collateral source rule, altering punitive damage rules, and capping some
damage awards. 50 In 1995 Congress enacted additional tort reform
measures with its "Contract with America., 51 The reforms called for the
adoption of the British rule of attorney fee shifting, the institution of
punitive damages limits, and major changes to the products liability
law.52 Continuing this progression, the Bush administration and the
Republican-controlled Congress pushed for mandatory removal of classaction suits to federal court, limits on asbestos liability, and a cap of
$250,000 on non-economic medical malpractice damages.53
Corporations and other employers argue that the negative
consequences of large judicial awards outweigh the plaintiffs' interests
in such suits. 54 They focus on the diminished ability of companies to
survive and prosper in a legal regime that allows large awards. When
large companies fail, the people they employ may be without work. The
products and services they provide dwindle, affecting the economy and
the public welfare. They emphasize that corporate health is crucial for
public welfare and the impacts of large settlements affect the public,
both as employees and as consumers. 55 Large money judgments are not
exclusively a phenomenon of personal injury claims, however. Courts
often render substantial verdicts in a wide variety of areas, including
common law contract and property claims, intellectual property, and
47. Id.at 1219.
48.

Id.

49. Id.at 1222.
50. Id.
51. Id.
at 1224.
52.

See "Common Sense" Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109 HARV. L.

REV. 1765, 1769(1996).
53. John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, Symposium: Access toJustice: Can Business Coexist with the Civil Justice System? /00 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort
Entrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1033-35 (2005).
54. John C. Moorhouse, Andrew P. Morriss & Robert Whaples, Law & Economics and Tort
Law: A Survey of Scholarly Opinion, 62 ALB. L. REV. 667 (1998) (noting claims by tort reform
proponents of outrageous fees).
55. See Edith Greene et al, Jurors' Attitudes About Civil Litigation and the Size of Damage
Awards, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 805, 806 (1991) (discussing the view that lawyers and clients were
suing America out of business); Thomas Koenig, The Shadow of Effect of Punitive Damages on
Settlements, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 169 (1998) (stating the tort-reformists' view that large settlements
bring a social cost bome by corporations, employees, consumers, and stockholders).
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torts outside the personal injury sphere. Indeed, some of the largest
verdicts ever awarded relate to economic loss without a link to personal
injury.56 This observation raises questions of proportionality between
the sanctions of contract and tort norms, including whether the interests
of defendants in tort cases deserve greater protection against high
verdicts than defendants in other matters.57
The United States system of tort law presents the considered
judgment that compensation to a victim of negligent conduct is
necessary to protect and compensate individuals who suffer harm as a
result of such conduct. The tortfeasor must pay for the consequences of
negligent conduct. More important, society also benefits from the
compensation to the individual tort victim. Society benefits because if
the law did not secure payment for the costs to the victim, those costs
might ultimately require public financing. Moreover, the public benefits
from the incentives of tort law against negligent activity. The policy
judgment that animates tort doctrine is that the norms that maximize due
care and minimize negligent conduct serve the public's interests.
"American tort law recognizes the corrective justice ideal by providing a
mechanism through which defendants, who have wrongfully injured
plaintiffs are required to compensate those plaintiffs, for their injuries
58
and thereby make them whole insofar as this is practically possible."
Thus, tort law serves not only the injured plaintiff, but also the public.
Society's stake in this issue is more than a summation of the needs of
individuals for compensation for negligent harm. Tort law also benefits
56. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 4 (1987) (abstaining from reviewing
jury verdict of almost $11 billion stemming from claim that Texaco tortuously interfered with
contract between Pennzoil and Getty Oil Co.); Biomedical Sys. Corp. v. GE Marquette Med. Sys.,
287 F.3d 707 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming a $75 million judgment for breach of contract involving a
company's failure to obtain FDA approval of a new medical device); Residential Funding Corp. v.
DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing an appeal for sanctions in a
breach of contract case in which the jury awarded $96.4 million in damages); Coc Serv.s Ltd., v.
CompUSA Inc., 150 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming trial court's entry of judgment
NOV in a breach of contract case where the jury awarded $90 million in compensatory damages);
Amy Johnson Conner, Doctor Wins $570 Million For His Inventions, LAWYERS WEEKLY 2004,
available at http://www.lawyersweeklyusa.com/usa/4topten2004.cfm
(reporting jury verdict of
$570 million in doctor's countersuit for breach of contract and patent infringement); Natalie White,
Surgeon Awarded $366 Million For Revoked Hospital Privileges, LAWYERS WEEKLY 2004,

available at http://www.lawyersweekIyusa.com/usa/6topten2004.cfm (discussing a $366 million
awarded to a doctor for breach of contract, defamation, interference with contractual relations and
intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of the conduct of fellow doctors at the hospital
where he worked).
57. Proponents of tort reform may see this statement as evidence that reform is needed
throughout the judiciary.
58.

(2003).

Benjamin C. Zipurksy, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 695
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society by reducing the number of injuries that occur. The desired result
of this system is that compensating injured victims will result in less
negligent conduct and, thus, fewer injuries in society at large. Focusing
on the interest of the individual litigant misperceives the foundational
purposes of tort law and fails to include in the balance the larger social
interests at stake. A focus on individual rights leaves out of the analysis
interests that are arguably the most important in the tort damage formula.
The incentive of damages serves a much larger purpose than simply
compensating the individual victims of negligence. This incentive
enhances safe conduct and minimizes risk and damage to society.
By limiting the amount of compensation that victims of negligent
conduct can recover, the success of the current tort reform movement
ultimately undermines the traditional disincentives of tort law intended
to compensate victims 59 as well as to discourage negligent conduct. Tort

reform fails to present a principled distinction between tort actions and
other types of claims. Likewise, the major tort reform advocates fail to
explore explicitly the public interests involved in the debate and the
rights of citizens to rely on government processes to redress wrongs. 60
V. EXPLICIT APPLICATION OF BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES
Modern American society faces persistent tensions regarding the
appropriate balance between protecting people from physical risks and
judicial and governmental solicitude for economic enterprise. The
general principles of consistent measurement of interests and
proportionality for treatment of competing interests have relevance to
the tort reform debate. Tort law protects the public in general by
creating disincentives against negligent conduct. The tort reform debate
is one example of this larger, long-standing debate. The public interest
weighs heavily in the arguments of each side of the debate. Nonetheless,
the competing vision of the common good and the weights in the scale
of the costs and benefits at issue are radically different. Indeed, the term
"reform" itself is part of the debate. 6 1 Like "tax reform," the term "tort
59.

See Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91 GEO.

L.J. 585 (2003) (explaining compensation rationale for tort liability).
60. John C.P. Goldberg, The ConstitutionalStatus of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to
a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 526 (2005) (arguing that "forms part of the

basic structure of our government" giving "all American citizens have a right to a body of law for
the redress of private wrongs").
61. As George Lakoff noted in his book, DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT (Collette Leonard,
ed., Chelsea Green 2004), framing of issues in public debate is of the first importance, His point is
as true in the tort reform area as in any other national topic today. For example, the Lawsuit Abuse
Reform Coalition (LARC) of 2005 was formed "to work for enactment of the federal Lawsuit
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reform" demonstrates the effectiveness of rhetorical framing. The
unspoken and important presumption embedded in the term "reform" is
the perspective that the ordinary system of tort law is broken and, thus,
needs fixing. 62 Tort reform, as the term is currently used, presents a
reconceptualization of traditional tort principles. In other words, it is an
adjustment of the scales of justice with a thumb on the scale for a
defendant's interests. The approach of consistent measurement argues
for including in the balance the public's interest in being protected from
unreasonable risks as well as the interest of the individual in being
compensated for the harm that befell him as a consequence of the
defendant's creation of an unreasonable risk.
The concept of proportionality as a due process principle is of great
significance in the recent tort reform debate. For example, Professor
Tracy Thomas argues that due process guarantees should be read as
prohibiting the government from stripping plaintiffs of the right to
63
redress injuries.
Proportionality plays a role in both punitive and
compensatory damages. It counsels full compensation in the ordinary
tort context and punishment of the defendant when the court determines
that punishment is necessary to discourage outrageous conduct in order
to protect individuals and the public. Because protection of the public is
the larger purpose of the tort liability regime, the focus of proportionality
analysis should include the protection of the public as well as the
consideration of individual litigants. In other words, proportionality in
this context includes societal risks and legal doctrines aimed at
minimizing those risks.
VI. CONCLUSION
This essay calls for consideration of the relationship of strong social
norms to the tort reform debate. Additionally, it inquires into the
concepts of measuring and comparing interests and the judgments of
proportionality inherent in traditional legal doctrines, scrutinizing in
particular the methodology of comparisons in tort reform. It is fair to

Abuse Reduction Act (LARA),

H.R. 420."

American Tort Reform Association, available at

http://www.lawsuitabusereform.org/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2005).
62. American Tort Reform Foundation's website defines its mission as "repairing our civil
justice system." http://www.atra.org/about/(last visited Nov. 11, 2005). It notes that the work of
the Foundation includes "champion[ing] elected officials and judges who want to fix the system."
Id.
63. See Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, fbi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy
Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633 (2004); Tracy A. Thomas, Congress' Section 5
Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673 (2001).
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say that both advocates of tort reform and those defending traditional
tort damages present an argument for fostering public interests. Each
side in the debate sets a theoretical framework of its argumentation as an
articulation of the public interest. Taking enhancement of the public
interest as the goal of each approach, the principle of consistent
measurement requires a balance of the inquiry. In myriad legal areas,
the matrix of judgment about competing interests is effectuated through
the tools of jurisprudence and rulemaking, including the use of
categories, presumptions, defaults, definitional standards, burdens of
proof, and other analytical tools. Such tools value economic rights and
the rights to physical safety and bodily integrity differently.
Tort reform measures should preserve the traditional balance and
fulfill the basic purposes of tort law that have long provided precedent
and social ordering. Consideration of the historical uses of tort law and
the normative baseline for comparing competing interests is crucial in
the tort reform debate. The hierarchy of norms represented by criminal
law, tort law, contract law, and other areas expresses the strength of
society's interest in restricting and discouraging conduct judged to be
contrary to the interest of individuals and society. A logical corollary is
that the weight of the interests protected bears a relationship to the
sanctions and remedies provided. The remedy available to a plaintiff in
any area of law is the signal indicator of the strength of the social norm
at issue in the contest of interests presented. Tort law creates a system
of liability for conduct deemed negligent or culpable. It encourages due
care by imposing liability for harm that results from a defendant's
creation of unreasonable risk of harm to others. The tort system includes
a deliberate assessment of the strengths of the norms involved in legal
doctrine for comparing individual and group interests in an even-handed
manner.

